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12 Anarchism and the politics of utopia 
Ruth Kinna 
 
There is a curious paradox at the heart of contemporary debates about the 
relationship between utopian and anarchist studies.  While anarchistic ideas 
have gained some purchase in utopian studies, there is a strong anti-utopian 
trend in modern anarchism.  What is puzzling about this paradox is that both 
positions seem to be shaped by a common set of concerns.  The anarchistic 
aspect of modern utopianism is marked by an engagement with an 
imaginative and open-ended exploration of alternative ways of being.  Valérie 
Fournier’s embrace of ‘grass roots utopianism’ flows from a rejection of 
utopias that prioritise ‘destinations’ over ‘journeys’ and ‘“better states”’ over 
‘movement and process’.1  The anti-utopian bent of modern anarchism is 
shaped by a worry that utopianism threatens precisely these kinds of practice.  
Jason McQuinn’s anarchist treatment of utopianism is informed by a suspicion 
of ends.  All preconceived ideals, he argues, necessarily constrain free 
thought.  Anarchists must, therefore, take particular care when discussing the 
nature of anarchy for any such discussion runs the risk of embedding in the 
analysis an ‘idealized, hypostatized vision’.2    
It is possible to explain this paradox by looking at the different anarchist 
traditions to which these parties appeal.  The former find inspiration in what 
might be called a romantic-anarchist tradition, exemplified - within political 
anarchism - by Gustav Landauer.  Anarchist anti-utopians, by contrast, base 
their critiques of utopianism on a rationalist, scientific strain of anarchist 
thought, usually associated with Peter Kropotkin.  Both sets of scholars might 
  
agree with Fournier that it is possible and necessary to distinguish 
‘utopianism’ as a way of thinking about qualitatively better states, opening up 
‘new conceptual spaces’, from ‘utopia’ if this is understood as a perfectionist, 
highly prescriptive or monistic attempt to delineate ‘“a” vision of “a” better 
society’.3  But anarchistic utopians and anarchist anti-utopians part company 
in their understanding of the earlier generation’s ability to hold these ideas 
apart.   
If this explanation of the paradox is correct, it begs questions about the 
manner in which the two anarchist traditions have been represented.  To what 
extent is it possible to distinguish a romantic from a rationalist tradition in 
anarchist thought?  In this chapter I discuss these early anarchist conceptions 
of utopianism and argue that the differences have been exaggerated. 
Certainly, Landauer and Kropotkin followed different paths, but they 
formulated their responses to utopianism in the same context, specifically 
through a political engagement with Marxism and an ideologically charged 
debate about scientific socialism.  Landauer met this claim by rejecting 
science as a paradigm for anarchist debate and trumpeting utopianism.  
Kropotkin instead tried to expose the fraudulence of scientific socialism by 
contrasting its metaphysical underpinnings to the positivist foundations of his 
own anarcho-communism.  These two responses could be harnessed easily 
within a single framework.  Indeed, Landauer’s concern that anarchists give 
content to the future in an effort to counter Marxism’s projected development 
and Kropotkin’s attempt to show that genuine science was neither teleological 
nor prescriptive came together in Warlam Tcherkesoff’s work.  Nineteenth 
century anarchists were utopians in the sociological sense that their thought 
  
had a transcendent, transformative character, but neither Landauer nor 
Kropotkin fits easily into the categorisations suggested by contemporary 
utopian or anarchist anti-utopian thought.  My contention is that their approach 
to anarchist utopianism has something to offer both.   
 
Utopianism and anarchist anti-utopianism  
The contrasting impressions that modern theorists of utopianism and 
anarchist anti-utopians have of historical anarchism stem from the critical 
frameworks each have adopted for their treatments of utopianism rather than 
any strong divisions in early anarchist thought.  At the turn-of-the-century, 
there was a strong consensus about the problems and possibilities of utopia 
in anarchist circles.  This consensus is well documented but it has been 
mediated by a modern engagement with Marxism.    On one side of the 
debate, modern theorists of utopianism have turned to anarchist (or 
anarchistic) ideas in order re-inject Marxism with a creative dimension that 
Marx and Engels are said to have wrongly overlooked.  On the other, 
anarchist anti-utopians argue that nineteenth century anarchists, albeit 
unwittingly, introduced into anarchism a theory of history as deterministic as 
Marx’s.    
To start with the consensus: the common thread that runs through 
nineteenth-century anarchism is the rejection of blueprint utopia.  Proudhon’s 
pithy reform forever, utopias never encapsulates the general view, but within 
this, it is possible to distinguish two main concerns.4  Some anarchists 
associated blueprints with notions of moral perfection or what Frank Manuel 
  
has called the ‘eternal Sabbath’ of utopia.5  Others were more disturbed by 
phalansterisme: the overly prescriptive design of the social order.   
At the heart of the first complaint was a suspicion of abstract ideals.   
Proudhon’s reflection on ‘association’ is indicative of this view.  Like all 
abstract ideas, he argued, ‘association’ was wrongly understood as 
‘something finished, complete, absolute, unchangeable’ - in other words, a 
utopia.  Those ‘who have taken up this Utopia have ended, without exception, 
in a SYSTEM’.  The view chimed in with the critique of ‘critical-utopian 
socialism’ in the Communist Manifesto though Proudhon cast his net more 
widely than Marx, capturing Cabet, Leroux, Blanc, Babeuf, Morelly, More, 
Campanella and Plato under the banner of utopianism as well as the familiar 
triumvirate: Owen, Fourier and St. Simon.6  Rudolf Rocker’s objection to 
utopia followed in much the same vein.  Anarchism, he argued, offers ‘no 
patent solution for all human problems, no Utopia of a perfect social order … 
since on principle it rejects all absolute schemes and concepts’.7   
The second complaint - of phalansterisme - was that utopians 
mistakenly believed that it was possible to design an ideal social order and 
somehow to escape existing social arrangements by the construction of these 
ideals.   This critique also dovetailed with Marx’s and it found expression in 
arguments about the wisdom of community-building and about the 
designation of anarchists by their commitment to particular (usually economic) 
goals: so-called anarchists-without-adjective worried that disputes between 
anarcho-communists, individualists and collectivists suggested the pre-
determination of anarchy whereas, Voltairine de Cleyre argued, ‘[l]iberty and 
experiment alone can determine the best forms of society’.8   
  
 Neither critique of blueprint utopia prevented anarchists from thinking 
about the future anarchist society.  Indeed, even those who professed 
themselves anti-utopians believed that anarchist anti-utopianism was 
consistent with the exploration of anarchy or utopia.   Colin Ward offers a 
modern defence of this position.  By probing private dreams, he argues, we 
reflect on the particularity of our desires and thus make room for other 
people.9  Nineteenth-century anarchists followed a slightly different tack, 
couching the argument in terms of the educative possibilities of utopia rather 
than its discursive function.  For David Andrade education meant practical 
experimentation and it was a necessary part of securing revolutionary change.  
‘When a few persons in any community are sufficiently educated in social 
principles, there need be no delay in carrying into practice the plan of 
campaign.’10  Andrade’s own co-operative scheme was offered as just one 
model they might follow.  In other circles, education was inspirational and it 
attached itself to elevated, idealistic aims.     
 
By education, by free organisation, by individual and associated 
resistance to political and economic tyranny, the Anarchist hopes to 
achieve his aim … Even our bitterest opponents admit the beauty 
of our “dream,” and reluctantly confess that it would be well for 
humanity if it were “possible.”  Anarchist Communist propaganda is 
the intelligent, organised, determined effort to realise the “dream”, 
and to ensure that freedom and well-being for all shall be 
possible.11 
 
  
These late nineteenth-century anarchist responses to utopianism were 
ably captured in Marie Lousie Berneri’s Journey Through Utopia.  Utopias, 
she argued, can be sorted into one of two categories: ‘authoritarian’ and ‘anti-
authoritarian’.  The first seek ‘the happiness of mankind through material well-
being’ but sink ‘man’s individuality into the group, and the greatness of the 
State.’  The second demand ‘a certain degree of material comfort’ and 
consider ‘that happiness is the result of the free expression of man’s 
personality and must not be sacrificed to an arbitrary moral code or to the 
interests of the State’.12  Utopia and anarchy are not irreconcilable ideas, but 
are consistent only when ‘utopia points to an ideal life without becoming a 
plan, that is, a lifeless machine applied to living matter.’  As a non-planned 
ideal, utopia ‘truly becomes the realisation of progress’.13  In their classic 
study Utopian Thought in the Western World the Manuels similarly describe 
the anarchist position as a rejection of blueprint utopia that falls short of anti-
utopianism.  There is, they note, no ‘significant utopian novel or full-bodied 
description of a future utopian society whose author would identify himself as 
an anarchist.’  And the reason is that anarchists viewed ‘the world of anarchy’ 
as ‘a spontaneous creation of the free, untrammelled spirit of the men … not 
fettered to any previously formulated plans or dogmas’.  A blueprint of 
anarchy, they continue, ‘would be self-contradictory, internally inconsistent, 
and anathema to anarchists’.14  Yet just as Berneri identifies an anti-
authoritarian trend in utopian thought, the Manuels also describe anarchism 
as a ‘utopian condition.’  Nineteenth-century anarchists were ‘seduced … into 
utterances about what an idea world should look like after the great outburst 
of destruction that would bring the new man into being’.15   
  
The distinction between blueprint utopia and utopianism resonates in 
modern utopian theory, though the links between it and nineteenth-century 
political anarchism are indirect.  The attraction of modern utopian theory to 
anarchism can be explained as a response to Marx’s anti-utopianism, 
famously captured in his refusal to consider recipes for the cookshops of the 
future on the grounds that socialism would be shaped by the inevitable crisis 
of capitalism and proletarian class struggle.   For Steven Lukes, this position 
was contradictory.  Marx and Engels could hardly claim ignorance about the 
form(s) socialism was likely to take whilst also claiming insight into the 
development of history.  Their mistake was to downplay the utopian 
implications of their thought; and the costs were ‘disastrously’ high.  Believing 
that ‘the ends would somehow call forth the appropriate means’, Marxism 
‘almost totally failed to bring social and political imagination to bear upon real-
life problems’.16   The leaders of so-called ‘actually existing socialism’ instead 
forcibly adjusted socio-economic conditions to suit the theoretical 
assumptions of the historical model.   
Since the 1970s, William Morris’s News From Nowhere has been seen 
as one of the earliest attempts to make up for the lacuna in Marx’s - and 
perhaps more pointedly, Engels’ - imagination.  Nevertheless, the most 
concerted effort to shift the balance within Marxism from science to utopia 
came, at around the same time, with a resurgence of interest in the Central 
European Jewish libertarian thought of the inter-war period.  Michael Löwy’s 
pioneering work argued that there was an elective affinity between Jewish 
messianic thought and libertarian utopianism which challenged the vulgar 
Marxist idea that history could be reduced to a ‘mechanical, repetitive and 
  
quantitative accumulation’ and suggested that social transformations were 
open to active interventions and ‘utopian novelty’.17  Löwy pointed out that the 
inherently libertarian quality of Jewish messianic thought was not anarchist in 
any strict sense.  Indeed, Ernst Bloch and Walter Benjamin - Marxist socialists 
- were two of the movement’s central thinkers.  Nonetheless, there was an 
important link to political anarchism through the work of Gustav Landauer, a 
significant figure both his own right and, after his murder in 1919 at the hands 
of Bavarian counter-revolutionaries, through the profound influence he 
exercised on other members of the group, notably, Martin Buber, as well as 
Bloch and Benjamin.18   
The attractiveness of Landauer’s work to modern theorists of 
utopianism stems from the poetic and mystical dimensions of his thought.  As 
Löwy notes, Landauer’s political thought was underpinned by a pantheistic 
religiosity, itself shaped by an interest in medieval Christianity and eighteenth-
century Jewish mysticism.  With these influences he fused a profound sense 
of nostalgia for community, inherited from German romanticism, a 
Nietzschean revolt against the philistinism of modern bourgeois society and a 
Rousseauean embrace of moral freedom.   The result was a form of socialism 
that was at once conservative, libertarian and revolutionary and, more to the 
point, one that emphasised creativity, imagination, passion, intuition and free 
expression.  These ingredients provided a perfect vehicle for utopianism.  As 
Buber argued, Landauer understood that socialism ‘can never be anything 
absolute.  It is the continual becoming of human community in mankind, 
adapted and proportioned to whatever can be willed and done in the 
conditions given’.19  
  
  The largely negative response of modern anarchists to nineteenth-
century anarchism reflects a theoretical worry about the status nineteenth-
century anarchists attached to the idea of historical development.  The 
problem here is not, as Lukes argues in respect of Marx, that the anarchists 
overplayed the concept of history and consequently disregarded utopia, but 
that they transformed what were intended to be educative models of anarchy 
into rigid utopias owing to a misplaced faith in natural scientific method and a 
conviction that history could be read like a rune.  The charge, which is part 
methodological and part political, bears some of the hallmarks of liberal anti-
totalitarianism associated with Popper, Hayek and others.20  But whereas 
liberal critics recommended empirical methods to safeguard against 
utopianism, anarchist anti-utopians add an epistemological complaint derived 
from post-structuralism and postmodernist thought to argue that rationalism 
and empiricism are the fast tracks to utopia.  
The story told by the Manuels is that nineteenth-century anarchist anti-
utopianism was rooted in an ‘ardent’ belief ‘in reason and the scientific 
method’.21  As Frank Manuel points out, the resulting utopias were typically 
‘open-ended’ and ‘virtually all … have continued metamorphoses built into 
their very frame’.22  Critics disagree.  Fastening on Kropotkin’s work, they 
dismiss nineteenth-century anarchism as naturalistic scientism.  According to 
this critique, anarchist theoreticians combined the language of science with a 
faulty understanding of scientific method to develop an evolutionary social 
science that was in Popper’s terms, historicist.   Anarchists - Kropotkin’s 
Darwinian theory of mutual aid is a prime target - came to believe that it was 
possible to describe laws of history and use these laws to make predictions 
  
about the future.   The result was not so much a blueprint as a straightjacket.   
With knowledge of the course of evolution, anarchists had no more need of 
recipes for the future than Marx.  They believed that there was no alternative 
future to the one history - anarchist theory - prescribed.  Moreover, in their 
optimism and certainty that they had placed anarchism on a scientific 
foundation, these anarchists wrongly believed that evolution pointed towards 
the eradication of all social conflict.   Robert Nozick, Jon Elster and Isaiah 
Berlin have all argued that utopia requires an unreasonable degree of 
consensus of its citizens, that it ignores trade-offs between competing moral 
values and leaves no room for genuine pluralism.  This is the essence of the 
charge against Kropotkin’s anarchist science: it breeds a utopianism that is 
both rigid and impossible.   
 
Although Kropotkin’s anarcho-communism … lacks any invisible, 
hidden or directing hand, it promises to be the evolutionary 
culmination of the better side to human nature.  The causal 
teleology is … finalistic and illegitimate; its locus is in a self-directed 
evolutionary process whose goal is Kropotkin’s utopia.  We are all 
urged to give the process a helping hand, which in the absence of 
any power to direct it would have to be a receptive frame of mind 
so general as to constitute a universal consensus.23  
 
Twenty-first century anarchist anti-utopian critics have resurrected 
these arguments, largely because of a political concern that nineteenth-
century anarchists failed to distance themselves sufficiently from Marxism.  
Saul Newman has recently made the case, rejecting the nineteenth century’s 
  
scientific and rationalist frameworks and, in particular, Kropotkin’s theory of 
mutual aid.  His broad claim is that the anarchists fell ‘into the same 
reductionist trap as Marxism’.24   
Newman identifies three errors in traditional anarchist thought: a 
commitment to the ‘idea of a rational social “object” that determines the 
revolutionary process,’ a Manichean conception of liberation as the removal or 
abolition of state power and, finally, an ideal of a rational and moralised post-
revolutionary subject.  In sum: 
 
classical anarchism … is sustained … by the utopian idea of 
society of the “other side” of power - a society … without the 
distortions and dislocations wrought by power and authority.  That 
is to say, there is a utopian fantasy of an Edenic state of fullness 
and reconciliation that would prevail in society once power relations 
have been eliminated.  Furthermore, there is, in anarchism, an 
idealization of the subject - the subject is seen as embodying an 
inherent morality and rationality … which has been distorted by 
political authority.  In other words, there is a political fantasy that 
sustains the revolutionary desire at the heart of anarchism - this 
fantasy consists of a Manichean division between the subject and 
authority, and the promise of a return to a lost rational and moral 
social objectivity once this authority has been eliminated.25 
 
Like the earlier generation of liberal and libertarian critics, Newman 
associates this vision of anarchy with stultifying uniformity.  Classical 
anarchism is based on ‘the fantasy of society without dislocation and 
  
antagonism’.26  Franco Ferrarotti advances a similar case.  Classical 
anarchists, he argues, were not utopians in the modern sense of the word 
because they could not see social change as a ‘piece-meal transformation 
which is constantly under the control of community judgment, in order to strike 
the best connection between what is ideally desirable and what is today 
already possible’.  Their utopianism was based on ‘grandiose, but highly 
unrealistic, dream of a totally liberated world through a cathartic revolution 
and a consequent palingenesis’.27  Anarchists in the mould of Kropotkin thus 
rejected blue-prints but remained as utopian, or in Berneri’s terms, 
‘authoritarian,’ as any other schemers.  This utopianism was the very opposite 
of the diverse, unbound utopianism that Löwy and others associate with 
Landauer.  It was neither open-ended, nor offered a corrective to scientific 
socialism.  Kropotkin failed to escape the scientific paradigms of the period 
and constrained anarchist hopes and dreams about the future in a utopian 
fantasy. 
 
 
Anarchism, Marxism and utopianism 
As modern theorists suggest, Landauer and Kropotkin’s relationship to 
utopianism was mediated by an understanding of scientific socialism, a term 
they associated with Marxist social democracy.  And it is through the 
examination of their critical responses to Marxism that their relationship to 
utopianism can best be understood.    
Landauer and Kropotkin elaborated their responses in the 1890s, when 
the ideological boundaries within European socialism were becoming less 
  
permeable.  The issue that galvanised the socialist movement and helped sort 
socialists into more clearly delineated camps was political action.  This 
described a policy of constitutional engagement in bourgeois politics and a 
commitment to parliamentarism as a means of securing revolutionary change.   
Social democrats, following the model favoured by Engels and the German 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) spearheaded the policy, arguing that electoral 
struggle offered socialists a route to power and therefore a means to bring 
about socialist transformation.  Opponents, many of whom did not think of 
themselves as anarchists, contested this view, typically arguing that 
participation in bourgeois politics was likely to breed reformism.  To this 
argument the anarchists added another: the problem with parliamentarism 
was that it pointed to an inadequate conception of the state.  Reiterating 
Bakunin’s complaint that Marx’s socialism required only shift of power within 
the state rather than the state’s abolition, anarchists argued that statelessness 
had an organisational as well as a class dimension which socialist party 
politicking completely overlooked.28  Landauer captured this view perfectly, 
attacking the model of social democracy pioneered in Germany as ‘intolerant 
and despotic’.  The party enjoyed phenomenal popular support but the 
strategy had ‘hitherto led to miserable failure and shall always fail’ because 
the structures of the state were replicated in the party’s own organisation.  
Germany, Landauer argued, was the ‘home of monarchism and militarism’ 
and far from challenging these pillars of the state, the SPD exploited them.   
 
[t]he German Social Democratic party in the most shameful way 
used this reactionary tendency of an oppressed people, this 
  
dependence of the masses, as the basis upon which an extremely 
strict party rule could be constructed, strong enough to crush on 
every occasion the rising germs of freedom and revolt.29 
 
 Social democrats, led by Engels, forged the link between anarchist 
anti-parliamentarism and utopianism by arguing that the policy of political 
action was informed by Marx’s discovery of historical materialism.  Marx had 
conclusively shown that all systems of production were subject to internal 
contradictions and that these could be resolved only through class struggle.  
When socialists entered into electoral competition they were not, therefore, 
entering into bourgeois politics but waging class war in a political system that 
was about to explode in revolution.  The Russian social democrat, George 
Pleckhanov, referred to the Manifesto to make the point: 
 
The true revolutionists of our days  … “everywhere support every 
revolutionary movement against the existing social and political 
order of things;”  which does not prevent them (but quite the 
contrary) from forming the proletariat into a party separate from all 
the exploiter parties, opposed to the whole “reactionary mass.”30  
 
Those, like Bakunin, who failed to see the oppositional and revolutionary force 
of political action simply showed that they were unable to digest the 
materialist conception of history.  Their critique of political action was based 
on an assessment of ‘the bourgeois parliamentary environment,’ not the 
‘environment of the electors, the environment of a working-class party, 
conscious of its aim and well organised’.31  The anarchist view was 
  
unscientific and, therefore, utopian.  Following Engels’ re-conceptualisation of 
utopianism in Socialism Utopian and Scientific, Pleckhanov concluded: 
 
The Anarchists are Utopians.  Their point of view has nothing in 
common with that of modern scientific Socialism.  But there are 
Utopias and Utopias.  The great Utopians of the first half of our 
century were men of genius; they helped forward social science, 
which in their time was still entirely Utopian. The Utopians of to-
day, the Anarchists … have nothing to do with social science, 
which, in its onward march, has distanced them by at least half a 
century.  Their “profound thinkers,” their “lofty theorists,” … are the 
decadent Utopians, stricken with incurable intellectual anaemia.  
The great Utopians did much of the development of the working 
class movement.  The Utopians of our days do nothing by retard its 
progress.32 
 
The anarchists were not slow to respond.  Tcherkesov led the charge: 
 
For a long while we have been told that men of genius, of German 
extraction, have created a truly scientific idealism founded upon the 
metaphysics of Hegel … But I long ago felt somewhat doubtful 
about it, because I knew that neither the metaphysics of Hegel nor 
the dialectical method so praised by Mr. Engels have had much 
influence among learned and thoughtful men […] 
  
I was very doubtful of anything really scientific could come of a 
philosophy rejected by science, condemned by historians … by … 
Marx himself … But under the influence of the fabricators of a 
pretentious legend it is attempted to impose upon the workers … 
this reactionary and aristocratic rubbish as a “scientific” basis for 
modern socialism.  It is true that enlightened men of independent 
minds have pronounced against the evil attempt of Liebknecht, 
Engels, Plekhanoff, [Plekhanov] and others; but the tide of reaction 
rises rapidly.  It is urgent to oppose it, to show the workers that 
their good faith is being abused, and that instead of humanitarian 
ideas, authority, bureaucracy, and officalism is being pressed upon 
them.33 
 
 Landauer and Kropotkin’s efforts to reveal the flaws of social 
democracy were based on different logics.  Landauer rejected the new 
pejorative spin the social democrats put on utopianism and openly attacked 
the notion that science provided a useful or appropriate foundation for 
socialism.  In contrast, Kropotkin attempted to exploit the evaluative force of 
science but detach it from social democracy.   
 Landauer based his critique of Marx’s thought on an idea of spirit.  
Spirit was the ‘inner compulsion’ which animated individuals, drawing them 
into collective actions and voluntary association; it was better thought of as a 
feeling than a concept.   For example, spirit was expressed in the words:’I 
know, I can, I may, I will, it must, and I should’.34  It was the ‘grasping of the 
whole in a living universal,’ the ‘unity of separate things, concepts and men’.  
  
In periods of change, spirit was ‘ardent enthusiasm, courage in the struggle … 
constructive activity’.35  In all its myriad forms, spirit contrasted with the 
‘unspirit’ - the ‘external force, regimentation’, the ‘centralism of command’ and 
discipline - of the state.36  And in none of them could it be confused with the 
idealism or ‘travesty of real spirit, namely Hegelian philosophy’ which provided 
the foundation for Marx’s ‘eccentric and ludicrous scientific superstition’.37  
Landauer located the difference between these two conceptions in the idea of 
immanence.  Instead of describing the indwelling, inherent, permanently 
pervading and sustaining spirit of the Christian scholars, ‘immanence’ in the 
Marxist tradition meant ‘that nothing requires special efforts or mental insights, 
everything follows smoothly from the social process’.  Specifically, it meant 
the ‘so-called socialist forms of organization are already immanent in 
capitalism’.38   In this guise, spirit was closely related to its opposite and it 
signalled the replacement of ‘cultural will’ with ‘politics and party’.39   
Whereas spirit gave full scope to desire and will as the motors of 
revolutionary change, Landauer linked Marxist un-spirit to an idea of 
revolution that tied action to phases of development outside human control.  
This idea raised problems of agency and it also pointed to a lack of 
revolutionary ambition.  Properly understood, he argued, socialism was ‘the 
tendency of will of unified men to create something new for the sake of an 
ideal’.40   It was supposed to make real things that were ‘otherwise hidden in 
our soul, in the structures and rhythms of art, in the faith-structures of religion, 
in dream and love, in dancing limbs and gleaming glances’.41  Marxists failed 
to appreciate this dimension of socialism and were mere ‘executive organs of 
the law of development’.42  To illustrate the poverty of Marxism Landauer 
  
contrasted the attitude of the socialist to the dry, mechanistic method of the 
politician.   Socialists were poets, Marxists, plotters.  Socialism was prophetic, 
Marxism predictive.  The socialist knows the ‘whole of society and of the past; 
feels and knows whence we come and then determines where we are 
headed’.  Marxists knew only economics.  Socialism was ‘a cultural 
movement, a struggle for beauty, greatness, abundance of the peoples.’43  
‘Philistine’ and ‘pigmy-socialism’ described ‘the uncultured plodder who knows 
nothing more important, nothing more splendid, nothing more sacred than 
technology and its progress’.44  The father of Marxism was not will or longing, 
but steam.45  
Not only did Landauer conclude from this analysis that the 
achievement of classlessness in social democracy would leave the fabric of 
the capitalist state intact (the ‘broad, centralized state’ he argued ‘already 
resembles his state of the future quite closely’),46 he also suggested that Marx 
and the social democrats warmly embraced this kind of socialism, using 
science to cloak the normative implications of their theory.  In particular, 
Landauer feared that the practical result of social democracy would be the 
imposition of technologically advanced, highly industrialised system of 
production and the eradication of all traditional, rural and communal practises.  
In 1896, as the Second International voted to make the commitment to 
political action a condition of entry, he put this resolution to the alternative 
Anarchist conference: 
 
The Anarchists no longer believe in the fatalistic and jesuitical 
doctrine of Marx, which declares the spread of Capitalism on a 
  
large scale and the elimination of all smaller producers to be 
necessary conditions for the realisation of Socialism. 
As to the land question: 
1. We reject State aid … 
2. We want to spread the principles of Free Socialism among 
labourers and peasants as well 
3. We desire that the peasants hinder proletarisation [sic] by 
associating themselves with their labourers in agricultural co-
operative associations … and creating organisations which might 
be the nuclei of socialistic Society. 
4. Considering that the desire just expressed can in many 
cases not be realised, we advise in the meantime labourers, as 
well as farmers and peasants, to unite for an energetic economic 
struggle against their exploiters.47 
 
Though Marx represented himself as a scientist, Landauer’s analysis 
suggested that he was a utopian of sorts - a utopian in Popper’s sense.  
‘Utopianists,’ Popper notes, ‘believe that their aims or ends are not a matter of 
choice, or of moral decision, but that they may be scientifically discovered by 
them within their fields of inquiry’.48  Landauer’s premises were, of course, at 
odds with Popper’s, but his conclusion was not dissimilar: Marx did not need 
to elaborate a clear vision of the future because his theory of history pointed 
to an image that was so familiar it hardly needed fleshing out.  Marxists 
denied ‘that their doctrine is merely a product of technical centralisation of 
enterprises.’  However, it was clear to Landauer that ‘all these forms of 
desolate, ugly, uniform, restrictive, and repressive centralism were … 
  
exemplary for Marxism’.49  Marx’s utopia was a ‘mirror image of the Utopia of 
the sated bourgeois’ and the ‘product of undisturbed laboratory development 
of capitalism’.50  It was no accident that Marxist science designated capitalism 
as a necessary stage of historical development and a foundation for 
socialism, because Marx’s socialism was only a form of the bureaucratic, 
centralised and militarised capitalist state.  Marx was a dreamer but ‘never 
was a dream emptier and drier’.  Indeed, of all ‘unimaginative fantasists’ 
Landauer argued, ‘the Marxists are the worst’.51  
Keen to disassociate himself from this kind of utopianism, Landauer 
tied his own brand of socialism to the tradition Marx claimed to have 
superceded: 
 
Yes … we want to do what you call experiments.  We want to make 
attempts.  We want to create from the heart, and then we want, if it 
must be, to suffer shipwreck and bear defeat, until we have the 
victory and land is sighted … Ashen-faced, drowsy men … are 
leading our people  … Where are the … victorious Reds who will 
laugh at these gray faces?  The Marxists don’t like to hear such 
words, such attacks, which they call relapses, such enthusiastic 
unscientific challenges.  I know, and that is exactly why I feel so 
good at having told them this.52      
  
The tone of Kropotkin’s critique of Marx was very different and it had a 
methodological as well as philosophical dimension, fastening on two issues: 
first Marx’s indebtedness to Hegelian metaphysics and second, his rejection 
of natural scientific methods.  These related ideas pointed to two different 
  
problems.  Whereas the Hegelian legacy wrongly suggested that history 
followed a predictable path, Marx’s preference for metaphysics over natural 
science led him to a faulty understanding of the future.    
Drawing on Comte’s sociology, Kropotkin painted Hegelian philosophy 
as an outmoded form of thinking that rested on the mistaken assumption - 
attributable, in modern times, to Kant - that it is possible to distinguish 
phenomena from noumena; ‘the domain of physics’ from what Kropotkin 
confusingly called ‘mental phenomena’.53  Accepting this distinction, 
metaphysicians like Hegel at once attempted to overcome it.  Kropotkin 
admitted that his ideas were ‘sometimes poetical’ and, moreover, they had 
succeeded in generating some useful generalisations about ‘the unity of 
physical and “spiritual” nature’.54  But the shortcomings were considerable: 
‘the dialectic method’ was ‘despairingly vague’ and ‘mostly based on naïve 
assertions.’  Hegel’s ‘total absence of proofs’ was ‘concealed by the 
vagueness of the arguments … nebulous reasonings … and grotesquely 
heavy style’.55  Kropotkin found one example of nebulousness in the concept 
of innateness.56  Echoing Landauer’s critique of ‘immanence’, Kropotkin 
argued that this concept enabled Hegelians to claim that there was a logic to 
history whilst disagreeing about its content.  Hegel’s generalisations were so 
‘abstract and cloudy’ that ‘one could deduce from them … the revolutionary 
spirit of Bakunin … the revolutionary Jacobinism of Marx, and the 
“Recognition of what exists,” which led so many “right wing” Hegelians to 
make “Peace with reality”’.  Yet, these same generalisations were also ‘easily 
exaggerated, and … represented as indisputable laws’.57   
  
Kropotkin found Marx’s materialist theory of history even less 
satisfactory than Hegel’s idealist version.  On the one hand, advances in 
knowledge showed the bankruptcy of the science Marx claimed to have 
discovered.  On the other, the path of development traced by Marx’s theory 
highlighted just how out of step with popular aspirations his brand of socialism 
really was.   Kropotkin fleshed out the first complaint by contrasting dialectical 
reasoning with natural science.  The latter was predicated on two principles: 
that all phenomena could be understood by the same method of inquiry and 
that knowledge was based on the application of ‘inductive-deductive’ method.  
In Modern Science and Anarchism he explained: 
 
We have heard of late very much about the dialectic method, 
recommended to us by Social Democrats in order to elaborate the 
Socialist ideal.  But we no more admit this method than would 
natural science.  The dialectic method reminds the modern 
naturalist of something very antiquated that has had its day and is 
forgotten … No discovery of the nineteenth century, in mechanics, 
astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, or 
anthropology, has been made by the dialectic method.  All the 
immense acquisitions of the century are due to the use of the 
inductive-deductive method - the only scientific method.  And as 
man is a part of Nature, as his personal and social life is a natural 
phenomenon … there is no reason why we should … abandon the 
method which till then has been so useful, and look for another 
method in the realms of metaphysics.58  
  
 
Pursuing his second complaint, Kropotkin argued that Marx’s failure to 
understand modern science led him to append to his theory of history an 
illiberal and unworkable ideal.  Like Landauer, he represented this ideal as 
‘the worship of the centralised State’.59  More precisely, in social democracy 
Kropotkin argued that this basic tenet supported a policy of gradual change ‘to 
mitigate … exploitation’ by means of ‘legal limitations’ and a commitment to 
the state nationalisation of major services.   The result, Kropotkin argued, was 
‘State Capitalism’.60  Had Marx been a genuine scientist and based his 
political theory on deductions supported by careful empirical observation he 
would have realised, as Kropotkin did, that the tendency of history was 
towards anarchy - the abolition of the state and capitalism - not its capture 
and control.  He would have understood that the desire for liberation, 
evidenced in countless popular revolutionary movements, was not a 
locomotive of history, but merely the expression of a strong human drive 
which, through the advances of modern science, nineteenth-century activists 
now knew could be satisfied.  And finally, he would have understood that the 
purpose of science was not to uncover a law of development, but to find ‘an 
answer to a plain question well put.’  
 
The question put by Anarchism might be expressed in the following 
way: “Which social forms best guarantee in such and such 
societies, and in humanity at large, the greatest sum of happiness, 
and therefore the greatest sum of vitality?”61 
 
  
Wrapping anarchism in the mantel of science, Kropotkin did not exploit 
the pejorative understanding of utopia in order to denigrate Marxism.  Instead, 
returning to the history of socialism, he challenged the basis of the dichotomy 
Engels had promoted.  Socialists, he argued, were never properly divided into 
scientists and utopians but primarily into authoritarian and anti-authoritarian 
camps.  For example, of the so-called utopians, St. Simon fell in the first 
division and Fourier and Owen the second.62   Marx, too, was an authoritarian, 
though Kropotkin traced his lineage from Babeuf, Blanqui and the ‘secret 
political organisation of the “Materialist Communists”’ which burgeoned in the 
1830s and forties, rather than St. Simon.63  Tracing his intellectual inheritance 
to Proudhon, with whom Owen had ‘joined hands,’ he put himself in squarely 
in the anti-authoritarian camp.  Thus, just as Landauer tied anarchism to a 
pre-Marxist experimental form of socialism, Kropotkin used his analysis of 
science to demonstrate his links with early anti-authoritarian pre-Marxist 
socialists and to highlight the superiority of his vision to the social democratic 
alternative.     
  Kropotkin’s attempt to place anarchism on a scientific foundation was 
not historicist in the sense in which Landauer accused Marx.  Using 
admittedly contestable arguments about the process of scientific inquiry and 
the unity of scientific methods, Kropotkin claimed that natural science 
provided a foundation for the kind of creative exercises at the heart of 
Landauer’s work.  To return to the analogy with Popper, he combined 
piecemeal social engineering - a desire to ‘design … remodel and service … 
social institutions’ without regard for the ‘ends … of human activity’ - with 
revolutionary ambition.64  The important difference between his work and 
  
Landauer’s was that Kropotkin believed that the centralisation of production 
and the exploitation of the existing technology anticipated by the social 
democratic state reflected Marx’s political preferences, not a scientifically 
informed view.  In contrast, Landauer believed that Marx’s science had some 
validity; left unhindered western societies were sure to develop along the 
alienating, industrially advanced lines that Marx described.  Nevertheless both 
Landauer and Kropotkin defended utopianism as a tool to consider the 
possibilities of socialism and elaborate the principles of anarchist 
organisation. 
The themes explored by Landauer and Kropotkin were brought 
together in the work of Warlaam Tcherkesov.  In Pages of Socialist History 
Tcherkesov argued that the claims social democrats made about the 
distinctiveness and originality of Marx’s science were baseless.  If Marx 
contributed anything original to socialism it was, as the economist Vladimir 
Simkhovitch argued, ‘his systematic coordination of ideas’.65    The 
‘cornerstone’ of Marx’s socialism, the theory of capitalist concentration, 
Tcherkesov argued, was the unhappy result of blending so-called French 
utopian socialism with German philosophy.  Bluntly, Marx and Engels had 
plagiarised the writings of the Fourierists Eugène Buret and Victor 
Considerant and mixed their ideas with Hegel’s ‘reactionary metaphysics’.66  
In his study of Considerant, Jonathan Beecher argues that Tcherkesov’s claim 
should be dismissed since Marxism has at its heart ‘an argument concerning 
the laws of historical change and the necessity of revolution which is not to be 
found in Considerant’.67  Tcherkesov’s argument was not, however, that Marx 
- still less Engels - remained faithful to the spirit of French socialism, but that 
  
his Hegelianism seriously distorted its arguments.  Whereas Considerant ‘so 
clearly indicated and formulated capitalist concentration of capital as a great 
social evil,’ Marx ‘turned it into a beneficent social law which would 
mechanically and peacefully liberate human society without any effort on its 
own side’.68  Simkhovitch’s objection was that this interpretation badly 
underestimated the importance Marx attached to revolutionary class struggle - 
‘a conception that permeates the whole Marxian system’.69  On this point, 
Tcherkesov argued that though it was Engels, not Marx, who denied the need 
for force in the revolutionary process,70 the discovery of the ‘law of capitalistic 
concentration’ had established an ‘economic fatalism’ which encouraged 
Engels’ view.71  In contrast to the revolutionaries of the 1840s - ‘Blanqui, 
Dejacques, Flocon and others’ – and, indeed, ‘peaceful French socialists’ like 
Considerant, Marx rejected calls for ‘immediate revolutionary action and social 
revolution’ and ‘immediate social reform’, substituting in their stead a 
bloodless idea of spontaneous evolutionary change.72   
Turning to the substance of Marx’s work, Tcherkesov questioned the 
arguments for concentration.  In general, he argued that genuine - i.e. natural, 
inductive - scientific methods suggested that the processes of social 
transformation were a good deal more complicated than Marx’s theory 
suggested.73  Marx claimed to be a materialist, but his ‘evolutionary 
generalisations’ were based on ‘economism’ - not the same thing at all.74  In 
particular, he argued that economic indicators lent no support to Marx’s 
theory.  Looking at data from 1840 to 1900, Tcherkesov concluded that the 
‘numbers neither of potentates of capital nor of smaller capitalists are 
diminished’.75  As Max Nettlau pointed out, Tcherkesov’s analysis ran parallel 
  
to Eduard Bernstein’s revisionism.76  However, whereas Bernstein questioned 
the idea of capitalist concentration in order to encourage a wholehearted 
embrace of parliamentarism, Tcherkesov advocated its abandonment and a 
return to revolutionary struggle.   The theory of concentration, he argued: 
 
lies at the root of the parliamentary tactics of State Socialists.  
From this point of view, the solution to the social question … 
becomes delightfully simple and easy.  No need for an economic 
struggle … no need to begin here and now to practice brotherly 
relations between man and man; … It is enough that the workers 
should vote for members of parliament who call themselves 
Socialists, that the number of these M.P.s should increase to the 
extent of a majority in the House, that they should decree State 
Colllectivism or Communism, and all exploiters will peaceably 
submit to the decision of parliament.  The capitalists will have no 
choice … for … their numbers will be reduced to an infinitesimal 
proportion of the nation.77 
 
Once socialists realised the fallaciousness of Marx’s theory, 
Tcherkesov’s hope was that they would use genuine - i.e. natural - scientific 
methods to help them make their own history and return, as Landauer 
suggested, to utopian notions of desire.  Pleckanov’s definition of a utopian, 
he noted, was ‘one who, starting from an abstract principle, seeks for a 
perfect social organisation’.  Tcherkesoff’s lengthy response is worth quoting 
in full: 
 
  
Read that sentence carefully, and you will discover that utopians 
are men of principle, and that they wish to reorganize present 
society, based on exploitation, ignorance, and oppression, in order 
to make out of it a solidary (sic) and communistic society, where 
the individual will have liberty, education and happiness among his 
fellow men, likewise, free enlightened, and happy.  I confess to 
being a utopian.  I am even afraid of not being so enough; for I 
might be suspected of being a man without principles, like Engels 
and his disciples, and like them, of being capable of distorting 
scientific terminology, the conception of Socialism, and lastly, 
instead of preaching emancipation and solidarity, of being capable 
of dishonouring myself so far as to preach the organization of the 
army of labour, especially of agriculture, discipline, subordination; 
in a word, Social Democracy.78 
      
Anarchism, utopianism and anti-utopian anarchism 
What does the analysis of these anarchist critiques of scientific socialism 
show about the nature of Landauer and Kropotkin’s utopianism?  In different 
ways, Landauer, Kropotkin and Tcherkesoff identified two flaws in Marxism: it 
was fatalistic and it pointed to a picture of socialism that was deeply 
unattractive.  Politically, they argued, Marx’s so-called science supported a 
misguided and futile strategy.  Landauer also accused Marx of adopting a 
theoretical framework that was alienating and uncreative, recommending that 
socialists jettison science in favour of imagination.  In contrast, Kropotkin and 
Tcherkesoff argued that Marx’s reasoning was unscientific and that natural 
  
science indicated that it was possible to resist social democracy.  As 
Kropotkin explained there was no certainty that it could be resisted: ‘we do not 
consider as “laws” certain “correlations” indicated by them’.79  Indeed, it was 
‘possible that we are wrong, and they [the Marxists] are right,’80 
notwithstanding the economic trends Tcherkesoff detected.  The answer then, 
was to think about how to exploit knowable trends to meet desirable goals.  
Here, Kropotkin, Tcherkesoff and Landauer were agreed.  As Landauer put it: 
the socialist ‘feels and knows whence we come and then determines where 
we are headed’.81  Each had a clear idea of what they wanted anarchy to look 
like.  None of them wanted to prescribe how all should live.   Landauer, then, 
had an image of anarchy and was not quite the open-ended utopian of 
modern utopian theory.  Kropotkin was confident that science demonstrated 
that anarchy was a viable alternative to social democracy, but contrary to 
anarchist anti-utopian critics, relied on the struggles of real people in the real 
world to give it content and ensure its delivery.  For both, utopianism was an 
essential part of the revolutionary struggle.  
In the 1960s Bruce McSheehy argued that ‘in a world in which 
utopianism has become universally stigmatised, [utopianism] is still 
necessary.’  ‘Toward what goal’ he asked ‘is socialism reaching?’  ‘No 
society’, he suggested ‘can exist without a goal, without a fulfilment’.82  
Landauer and Kropotkin would have agreed.  Perhaps, though, Tcherkesov 
should have the last word: ‘And you also, friend and reader, I wish with all my 
heart that you should always remain a man of principle.  Every honest man 
must have principles and if this quality belongs to utopians, be a utopian.’83 
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